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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Statement of Facts

1.

Gordon Buys Property and Defaults on Loan

On February 28'\ 2006, Appellant (Ellen) Gittel Gordon ("Gordon") executed a
promissory note (the "Note"), pursuant to which she borrowed $1,440,000.00 to purchase a home
in Ketchum, Idaho (the "Property"). Record on Appeal ("RA") 212. The Note had a maturity date
of March 1, 2036 and required Gordon to make monthly installment payments in the amount of
$7,050.00. RA 212-213. The Note was secured by a deed of trust on the Property (the "Deed of
Trust"). RA 57-71. Gordon stopped making the required monthly payments on the Note in
approximately June of 2012. RA 249.
2.

Gordon Seeks Modification

On or about October 22, 2014, Gordon submitted a loss mitigation application to Select
Portfolio Servicing, Inc. ("SPS")-the mortgage servicer of the Note-requesting a modification
of the terms of the Note. RA 344. On May 7, 2015, SPS issued a decision denying Gordon's
request. RA 242. SPS reasoned that there were no loss mitigation options available for Gordon
because her modification request failed SPS's net present value test. RA 243. Gordon appealed
the decision, arguing that SPS incorrectly calculated her income because it did not consider certain
income she received from a trust. RA 240. In a letter dated June 12, 2015, SPS upheld its decision,
reasoning that Gordon's "income was calculated correctly per the US Treasury guidelines based
on the financial information [Gordon] provided at the time of submission." RA 240. In this first
loss mitigation application, the only proof of income SPS received was Gordon's social security
income-Gordon had not provided SPS with any proof of additional income from a trust. RA 344.
SPS instructed Gordon to submit a new loss mitigation application with complete supporting
documentation if she desired to have SPS re-evaluate her loan. RA 240.

In September of 2015, SPS denied a subsequent application from Gordon to modify the
terms of the Note. RA 52-56. In reviewing this request, SPS initially calculated Gordon's gross
income at $1,600 per month. RA 55. However, SPS subsequently re-calculated Gordon's gross
income at $9,681.75 based on certain income received through a trust. RA 55. Nonetheless, SPS
was still unable to approve Gordon's request for modification because it was "unable to create an
affordable payment equal to 31 % of [Gordon's] reported monthly gross income without changing
the terms of [Gordon's] account beyond the requirements of the program." RA 53.
At Gordon's request, SPS sent Gordon a third loss mitigation application on February 18,
2016. RA 34. However, Gordon never completed the application and did not submit the required
documents to SPS within the timeframe specified. RA 34. Accordingly, SPS closed Gordon's
request for review on December 7, 2016. RA 34.

3.

Respondents Foreclose

On August 31, 2016, Lisa McMahon-Myhran, as trustee, 1 recorded a Notice of Default
against Gordon in Blaine County. RA 192-93. A Notice of Trustee's Sale scheduled a foreclosure
sale of the Property for January 11, 2017. RA 257-58. The Notice of Default, Notice of Sale, and
additional documentation were mailed to Gordon on September 7, 2016. RA 194-95. The Notice
of Default, Notice of Sale, and additional documentation were also posted at a conspicuous place
on the Property on September 28, 2016, October 8, 2016, and again on October 17, 2016. RA 261.
The process server reported the Property as being vacant. RA 261. The Notice of Sale was also
published in the Idaho Mountain Express, a Blaine County newspaper, each week for four
consecutive weeks beginning on October 5, 2016. RA 262-63.

1
An Appointment of Successor Trustee, naming Lisa McMahon-Myhran as trustee, was recorded in Blaine County
on February 8, 2016. RA 21.

2

The foreclosure sale scheduled for January 11, 2017 was subsequently postponed four
times. First, on January 11th, the sale was postponed to February 9, 2017. RA 278-79. On
February 9th, the sale was postponed to March 9, 2017. RA 280-81. On March 9th, the sale was
postponed to April 6, 2017. RA 282. Finally, on April 6th, the sale was postponed by order of the
district court to April 24, 2017. RA 415. Gordon requested injunctive relief from the district court
to prevent the foreclosure sale-however, the district court denied Gordon's request and explicitly
permitted the April 24th foreclosure sale to proceed. RA 427. Accordingly, the foreclosure sale
was held as scheduled on April 24, 2017. 2
B.

Procedural History
1.

District Court

On January 9, 2017, Gordon filed a complaint against Respondents in Blaine County,
asking the district court to (i) enjoin the foreclosure sale scheduled for January 11th and (ii) award
Gordon damages for "violations of Dodd-Frank, the Mortgage Rules, breach of the deed of trust,
and Title 45, Chapter 15 of the Idaho Code." RA 28. Gordon also filed a motion for a temporary
restraining order requesting injunctive relief in connection with the pending foreclosure sale.
RA 114-117. As set forth above, Respondents voluntarily agreed to postpone the foreclosure sale
four separate times while the litigation was pending before the district court. See RA 278-82, 415.
On March 10, 2017, Respondents filed a Notice of Hearing, scheduled for April 4th, on
their Motion to Dismiss and Objection to Motion for Temporary Restraining Order. RA 133-34.
On March 15, 2017, Gordon filed a Notice of Hearing, also scheduled for April 4th, on Gordon's
Motion for Temporary Restraining Order. RA 206-07. On March 22, 2017, Gordon filed a Motion

2

On April 24, 2017, Lisa McMahon-Myhran, as trustee, sold the Property at public auction to the credit-bidder for
the sum of $1,035,000.00. A Trustee's Deed evidencing such sale was recorded in Blaine County on April 28, 2017
as Instrument #643 170.
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to Strike the Declaration of Lisa McMahon-Myhran and an accompanying Motion to Shorten Time
requesting a hearing on the motion on April 4th as well. RA 264-269. On March 27, 2017,
Respondents also filed a Motion to Shorten Time, asking for all pending motions to be heard at
the scheduled April 4th hearing. RA 303-305. On March 28th, the district court granted Gordon's
and Respondents' Motions to Shorten Time. RA 307-310.
On April 4, 2017, the district court held its scheduled hearing for the various pending
motions. See Reporter's Transcript on Appeal ("RT"). At this hearing, counsel for Gordon and
counsel for Respondents met and conferred with Judge Jonathan Brody and presented various
arguments regarding the pending motions. Judge Brody was also presented with witness testimony
at this hearing. RT 41-64. Respondents agreed to postpone the foreclosure sale to April 24th while
Judge Brody took the motions under advisement. RT 105.
On April 24, 2017, the district court released its order granting Respondents' motion to
dismiss and denying Gordon's motion for a temporary restraining order and motion to strike.
RA 417-427. The district court concluded that the postponement of the foreclosure sale was
properly cried, Gordon was properly notified of the foreclosure sale, Lisa McMahon-Myhran was
properly instated as a successor trustee, Respondents did not violate Dodd-Frank or Reg. X, and
Respondents did not violate the covenant of good faith and fair dealing.

RA 420-426.

Accordingly, the district court dismissed Gordon's complaint and explicitly permitted the
foreclosure sale scheduled for April 24, 2017 to proceed. RA 427.
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2.

Appeal

Gordon initiated the present appeal pro se3 by filing a Notice of Appeal on May 26, 2017.
RA 433. On June 7, 2017, Gordon filed a motion for stay with the district court, asking for a stay
of the April 25, 2017 Judgment and the April 26, 2017 Amended Judgment pending appeal.
RA 439. Pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule 13, Gordon filed a motion for stay with this Court on
August 28, 2017. RA 466. This Court denied Gordon's motion on September 22, 2017. RA 466.
The deadline for Gordon's Opening Brief, originally scheduled for December 21, 2017, was
extended to January 25, 2018 and then again to March 1, 2018. Gordon filed her Opening Brief
on March 1, 2018 ("Opening Brief').
ISSUES PRESENTED

In her Opening Brief, Gordon appears to set forth at least 14 issues on appeal. Opening
Brief at 2. In accordance with Idaho Appellate Rule 35(a)(6), Appellant must support each issue
on appeal with proper argument-including "the reasons therefor, with citations to the authorities,
statutes and parts of the transcript and record relied upon."

Failure to comply with such

requirement constitutes waiver of such issue. 4 See Idaho Power Co. v. Cogeneration, Inc., 134
Idaho 738, 745, 9 P.3d 1204, 1211 (2000). Accordingly, the issues on appeal can be grouped into
three general categories as follows:

I.

Did the district court err m granting summary judgment as to whether the

foreclosure sale was properly postponed?

3

Gordon, an attorney herself, was represented by attorney Scott Rose in the proceedings before the district court.
RA6.

4

Applicable here, one of the primary issues Gordon raised before the district court was whether Lisa McMahonMyhran was properly instated as a successor trustee. The district court correctly concluded that Ms. McMahonMyhran was properly instated in such role. RA 422. Gordon has not raised this issue on appeal - her Opening Brief
does not contain any argument or citations to authorities or the record as to this issue. Accordingly, such issue is
waived.

5

IL

Did the district court err in finding that Respondents properly considered Gordon

for loss mitigation options?
III.

Did the district court err in allowing Respondents' motion to dismiss to proceed to

a hearing on April 4, 2017?
ATTORNEYS' FEES ON APPEAL

In accordance with Idaho Appellate Rules 41 and 54, Respondents request attorneys' fees
on appeal under Idaho Code §§ 12-120(3) and 12-121 and the express terms of contractual
agreements between the parties.
Idaho Code § 12-120(3) entitles the prevailing party in any civil action arising from a
commercial transaction to recover attorneys' fees. Commercial transactions are broadly defined
in § 12-120(3) as "all transactions" except those for personal or household purposes. In order to
invoke§ 12-120(3), courts look to whether an asserted commercial transaction is the "gravamen"
of the claim at issue. Great Plains Equip., Inc. v. Nw. Pipeline Co., 156 Idaho 466, 472, 36 P.3d
218, 224 (2001 ). Here, the gravamen of the claims at issue surround the terms of the Note and
Deed of Trust, and remedies associated with default under the same.
Idaho Code § 12-121 permits an award of reasonable attorneys' fees to a prevailing party
where the party against whom the award of fees is sought has "pursued or defended [a claim or
appeal] frivolously, unreasonably, or without foundation." Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(e)(2).
Here, Gordon continues to pursue her claims frivolously, unreasonably, and without foundation,
including, without limitation, her motions to stay the judgment filed with the district court and
with this Court after the foreclosure sale had already occurred.
Finally, Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(e)( 1) provides that a court may award reasonable
attorneys' fees to a prevailing party when such an award is authorized by contract. As the product
of voluntary, mutual choice, such contractual provisions are "generally honored in Idaho." Zenner
6

v. Holcomb, 147 Idaho 444, 452, 210 P.3d 553, 560 (2009). Indeed, Idaho courts give great
deference to the bargained-for terms of an agreement between contracting parties. Id. Here, the
Deed of Trust and the Note mandate an award of attorneys' fees to Respondents. See RA 69 (Deed
of Trust) ("Lender shall be entitled to collect all expenses incurred in pursuing the remedies
provided [in the Deed of Trust, including accelerating amounts due and invoking the power of
sale], including, but not limited to, reasonable attorneys' fees and costs of title evidence."); RA 214
(Note) ("[T]he Note Holder will have the right to be paid back by [Gordon] for all of its costs and
expenses in enforcing this Note to the extent not prohibited by applicable law. Those expenses
include, for example, reasonable attorneys' fees.").
STANDARD OF REVIEW

"On appeal from the grant of a motion for summary judgment, this Court employs the same
standard as used by the district judge originally ruling on the motion." Intermountain Forest
Mgmt., Inc. v. Louisiana Pac. Corp., 136 Idaho 233, 235, 31 P.3d 921, 923 (2001). Summary
judgment is appropriate "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material
fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 56.
"When an action, as here, will be tried before the court without a jury, the trial court as the
trier of fact is entitled to arrive at the most probable inferences based upon the undisputed evidence
properly before it and grant the summary judgment despite the possibility of conflicting
inferences." P.O. Ventures, Inc. v. Loucks Family Irrevocable Trust, 144 Idaho 233,237, 159 P.3d
870, 874 (2007).

"Resolution of the possible conflict between the inferences is within the

responsibilities of the fact finder." Id. "This Court exercises free review over the entire record
that was before the district judge to determine whether either side was entitled to judgment as a
matter of law and reviews the inferences drawn by the district judge to determine whether the
record reasonably supports those inferences." Id.
7

ARGUMENT

I.

THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ERR IN GRANTING SUMMARY
JUDGMENT ON THE ISSUE OF WHETHER THE FORECLOSURE SALE WAS
PROPERLY POSTPONED.

While the underlying litigation was pending in the district court, the foreclosure sale of the
Property, originally scheduled for January 11, 2017, was postponed several times. Gordon alleges
that on one of these occasions-the February 9th sale-the postponement was not properly cried.
The district court disagreed. After reviewing the record and hearing testimony from witnesses, the
district court concluded that the most probable inference was that "the foreclosure was properly
cried on the appropriate day and at the appropriate time." RA 420. The district court did not err
in reaching this conclusion. First, this case was to be tried before the district court without a jury.
As such, the district court was "entitled to arrive at the most probable inferences" and "grant the
summary judgment despite the possibility of conflicting inferences." P.O. Ventures, Inc., 144
Idaho at 237, 159 P.3d at 874. Second, in the alternative, even if the foreclosure sale was not
properly postponed on February 9th, Gordon has not requested any type of relief that the district
court or this Court could grant. Thus, summary judgment would still be proper.
A.

The district court correctly concluded that the foreclosure sale was properly
postponed.

"If the district court sits as the trier of fact, it may draw reasonable inferences based upon
the evidence before it and may grant summary judgment despite the possibility of conflicting
inferences." Stafford v. Klosterman, 134 Idaho 205, 206, 998 P.2d 1118, 1119 (2000). Indeed,
"[r]esolution of the possible conflict between the inferences is within the responsibilities of the
fact finder." Cameron v. Neal, 130 Idaho 898,900,950 P.2d 1237, 1239 (1997). "The test for
reviewing the inferences drawn by the trial court is whether the record reasonably supports the
inferences." Intermountain Forest Mgmt., Inc., 136 Idaho at 235, 31 P.3d at 923.
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Here, the district court was presented with evidence from both parties regarding the
postponement of the February 9th foreclosure sale. Both sides submitted affidavits from witnesses
on the issue. See RA 203-05 (affidavit of Lori Tandy); RA 275-82 (affidavit of Lisa McMahonMyhran); RA 314-25 (affidavit of Michael Legg); RA 326-30 (affidavit of Stephanie Legg);
RA 373-75 (affidavit of Steve Christensen). These affidavits presented conflicting inferences. For
Gordon, Lori Tandy5 and her boyfriend, Steven Christensen, stated that they were both at the
Blaine County Courthouse at the appointed time and that nobody appeared to cry the postponement
of the foreclosure sale. RA 204; 374. For Respondents, Michael Legg stated that he appeared at
the Blaine County Courthouse at the appointed time and verbally postponed the February 9th sale
to March 9, 2017.

RA 315.

Michael Legg also provided an executed copy of the Idaho

Postponement Script for the postponement date in question, RA 322, and a photograph of the
Blaine County Courthouse taken just prior to postponing the sale, RA 325.
To further develop the available evidence, the district court heard witness testimony at the
April 4th hearing from Lori Tandy, RT 41-51, and from Michael Legg, RT 51-64. Ms. Tandy
testified that she was with Mr. Christensen at the appointed time and place for the scheduled
foreclosure sale on February 9th, that she entered the Courthouse, used the restroom, and confirmed
with Mr. Christensen that that nobody appeared to announce the postponement of such sale. RT

47-49. In contrast, Mr. Legg testified that he was at the appointed time and place for the scheduled
foreclosure sale on February 9th and cried the postponement. RT 57. Ms. Tandy testified that the
foreclosure sale on February 9th was the first foreclosure sale or postponement that she had ever
attended. RT 49. In contrast, Mr. Legg testified that he had postponed nearly one thousand
foreclosure sales. RT 55. Ms. Tandy testified that she was at the Courthouse from 10:40 to 11 :20

5

Lori Tandy is the paralegal for Scott Rose, counsel for Gordon before the district court. See RT 42.
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the morning of February 91h, and that during this time she was either in the Courthouse, in the
restroom, or on the Courthouse steps. RT 46-48. Mr. Legg testified that he kept accurate business
records of the postponement, including an executed postponement script and a photograph of the
location. RT 57.
Sitting as the finder of fact and having heard all of the available evidence before itincluding witness testimony-the district court concluded that "the most probable inference from
the testimony is that the parties merely missed each other while at the courthouse and that the
foreclosure was properly cried on the appropriate day and at the appropriate time." RA 420. The
record "reasonably supports" this inference. See lntermountain Forest Mgmt., Inc., 136 Idaho at
235, 31 P.3d at 923. Ms. Tandy testified that she was at the Courthouse. Mr. Legg testified that
he too was at the Courthouse and provided the proper business records evidencing the same. As
required by Idaho law, the district court reviewed the available evidence, resolved any possible
conflict in inferences, and reached a conclusion reasonably supported by the record.

B.

Even if the foreclosure sale was not properly postponed, Gordon has not
requested any relief or remedy permitted under Idaho law.

Idaho Code § 45-1506 provides for the manner of foreclosure for a deed of trust.
Applicable here, subsection 8 outlines the process to postpone a foreclosure sale-"The trustee
may postpone the sale of the property upon request of the beneficiary by publicly announcing at
the time and place originally fixed for the sale the postponement to a stated subsequent date and
hour.'' Idaho Code § 45-1506(8). Without any citation or legal support, Gordon repeatedly alleges
that the penalty for failing to comply with this provision is that the foreclosure sale is canceled and
must start anew. See Opening Brief at 6-7. However, Gordon's request to cancel the foreclosure
sale is moot, as the foreclosure sale has already occurred. To the extent Gordon now requests this

10

Court to unwind or set aside the foreclosure sale, such relief is not supported by law. Further,
Gordon has not alleged any form of damages that the district court or this Court could grant.
Idaho Code § 45-1508, provides that "[a] sale made by a trustee under this act shall
foreclose and terminate all interest in the property covered by the trust deed of all persons to whom
notice is given under section 45-1506." Section 1508 further specifies that "any failure to comply
with the provisions of section 45-1506, Idaho Code, shall not affect the validity of a sale in favor
of a purchaser in good faith for value at or after such sale, or any successor in interest thereof."
Even outside the context of § 1508, invalidation of a foreclosure sale is not the proper
remedy here for a violation of the foreclosure procedures set forth in § 1506. In Spencer v.

Jameson, the original owners of a foreclosed property sought invalidation of a foreclosure sale,
alleging that such sale violated § 1506(9) because the credit bid purchaser had not paid cash for
the portion of the bid in excess of the loan amount. 147 Idaho 497,502,211 P.3d 106, 111 (2009).
On appeal, the Idaho Supreme Court concluded that § 1506(9) had in fact been violated. Id. at
503, 112. However, the Court refused to invalidate the foreclosure sale, reasoning that "the
legislature did not intend for a sale to be set aside." Id. at 504, 113. Further, the Court stated that
"Grantors may still tum to LC. § 45-1507 which governs the manner [in] which the sale proceeds
are to be distributed for relief." Id.
In comparison, in Taylor v. Just, the original owners of a foreclosed property sought
invalidation of a foreclosure sale, alleging that they did not default their obligations under the deed
of trust and therefore the resulting foreclosure sale violated Idaho Code§ 45-1505. 138 Idaho 137,
59 P.3d 308 (2002). On appeal, the Idaho Supreme Court agreed and voided the foreclosure sale,
reasoning that such sale violated § 1505 because "there was no default in the performance of any
obligations secured by the deed of trust." Id. at 141, 312. The Court further reasoned that the

11

protections of § 1508 were not applicable, because § 1508 applied "only to sales challenged
because of a failure to comply with the provisions of§ 45-1506."6 Id.
The protections of§ 1508 and this Court's analysis in Spencer are applicable to the issues
presented by the instant case. Per the district court's explicit orders, the foreclosure sale proceeded
on April 24, 2017. Gordon has offered no evidence or argument that the resulting sale was not
made in good faith. Further, in accordance with sections 1506 and 1508, Gordon was given proper
notice of the sale. Following the analysis of Spencer, the proper remedy for Gordon's allegations
lies in Idaho Code § 45-1507. For example, Gordon could argue (she has not) that she is entitled
to proceeds of the foreclosure sale under § 1507, and that such proceeds were less than they would
have been had the sale been properly postponed-presumably because any buyers that showed up
to the February 9th sale would not have received notice of postponement, thus reducing the number
of potential buyers and deflating the price paid. 7
Moreover, this Court's decision in Taylor is readily distinguishable.

Here, Gordon

executed a Deed of Trust to secure payment of the Note. RA 57-71. The Note obligated Gordon
to make monthly payments in the amount of $7,050.00. RA 212-213. Gordon defaulted on her
obligations by failing to make the required monthly payments, starting in approximately June of

6 Reviewing the Idaho Supreme Court's decisions in Spencer and in Taylor, Judge Winmill for the United Stated

District Court for the District of Idaho summarized their holdings as follows:
Reading these cases together, the Court concludes that § 45-1508 prevents
grantors from voiding a foreclosure sale where ( 1) notice of sale was given under
§ 45-1506, (2) the trustee accepted payment and executed the deed to the bidder,
and (3) the statutory scheme affords the grantor alternative protections or
remedies for the particular violation of the Trust Deed statutes at issue. This is the
reading of Spencer that is most generous to Plaintiffs; state courts could well
interpret Taylor as only controlling when the grantor is not actually in default, the
interpretation that Defendants urge this Court to adopt.
Russell v. OneWest Bank FSB, 2011 WL 5025236 at *8 (D. Idaho Oct. 20, 2011).
7 Of course, such an argument (ifraised) would have its own difficulties here. As Lori Tandy and Steven Christensen
admitted, neither saw any potential buyers at the scheduled February 9th foreclosure sale. See RA 374; RT 48-49.
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2012.

RA 249.

Further, Gordon was provided with the notices required by § 1508.

Lisa

McMahon-Myhran, as trustee, recorded a Notice of Default against Gordon in Blaine County.
RA 192-93. The Notice of Default, a Notice of Trustee's Sale, and additional documentation were
mailed to Gordon.

RA 194-95.

The Notice of Default, Notice of Sale, and additional

documentation were posted on the Property three separate times. RA 261. The Notice of Sale was
also published in a local newspaper each week for four consecutive weeks. RA 262-63.
Accordingly, injunctive relief in the form of voiding the properly conducted foreclosure
sale is not a proper remedy for the alleged violations of§ 1506 and the district court's grant of
summary judgment was proper.

II.

THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT RESPONDENTS
PROPERLY CONSIDERED GORDON'S LOSS MITIGATION OPTIONS.
Gordon alleges that Respondents violated the Dodd-Frank Act and other unspecified

federal laws by impermissibly engaging in "dual-tracking" and by failing to consider Gordon's
loan modification request.

See Opening Brief at 24-25. The district court concluded that

Respondents complied with applicable regulations and considered Gordon's modification requests
in good faith. RA 423-24. The district court did not err in reaching these conclusions.

A.

Respondents complied with all applicable regulations.

A ··common challenge borrowers raise in foreclosure litigation is dual-tracking, which
refers to the industry practice of continuing to pursue a foreclosure action against a delinquent
borrower while, at the same time, the borrower is attempting to obtain some loss mitigation option
to prevent foreclosure." Mitchel H. Kider et al., Real Estate & Mortgage Banking§ 7: 117 (2017).
"[T]he [Consumer Financial Protection Bureau's] new servicing regulations, effective January 10,
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2014, significantly inhibit dual-tracking, although they do not prohibit the practice entirely." 8 Id
Such regulations are set forth in Title 12 of the Code of Federal Regulations, Chapter X, Part 1024,
Subpart C ( 12 C.F .R. § 1024.41 ). The portions of these regulations applicable to the case at hand
are as follows:
First, "[n]othing in § 1024.41 imposes a duty on a servicer to provide any borrower with
any specific loss mitigation option." 12 C.F.R. § 1024.4l(a). However, a servicer may not initiate
the foreclosure process unless (i) a borrower is more than 120 days delinquent, (ii) the foreclosure
is based on a violation of a due-on-sale clause, or (iii) the servicer is joining a foreclosure action
of another lienholder. Id at 1024.41 (f)( l ). If a borrower submits a complete loss mitigation
application9 before the servicer initiates the foreclosure process, the servicer is prohibited from
initiating the foreclosure process until (i) the servicer sends the borrower notice that the borrower
is not eligible for any loss mitigation options, (ii) the borrower rejects all loss mitigation options
offered by servicer, or (iii) the borrower fails to perform under an agreement on a loss mitigation
option. Id. at 1024.4l(f)(2). If the servicer has already initiated the foreclosure process and
borrower submits a complete loss mitigation application more than 37 days before a foreclosure
sale, such servicer is prohibited from moving for a foreclosure judgment or order of sale or
conducting a foreclosure sale until (i) the servicer sends the borrower notice that the borrower is
not eligible for any loss mitigation options, (ii) the borrower rejects all loss mitigation options
offered by servicer, or (iii) the borrower fails to perform under an agreement on a loss mitigation

8

The district court correctly concluded that there are no Idaho statutes or regulations prohibiting dual-tracking.
RA 423. Gordon seizes upon this point, seemingly to suggest that the district court failed to recognize the applicability
of the Dodd-Frank and other federal law in Idaho. See Opening Brief at 23. However, the district court correctly
recognized the applicability of federal law and carefully reviewed whether Respondents violated the provisions of
Dodd-Frank or Regulation X. See RA 423-24.
9

"Complete loss mitigation application" is defined as "an application in connection with which a servicer has received
all the information that the servicer requires from a borrower in evaluating applications for the loss mitigation options
available to the borrower." 12 C.F.R. § 1024.4l(b)(I).
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option. Id. at I 024.41 (g). Finally, a servicer is not required to consider more than one loss
mitigation application:

A servicer must comply with the requirements of this section for a
borrower's loss mitigation application, unless the servicer has
previously complied with the requirements of this section for a
complete loss mitigation application submitted by the borrower
and the borrower has been delinquent at all times since submitting
the prior complete application.

Id. at 1024.41 (i) (emphasis added).
Here, Gordon pursued at least three separate loss mitigation applications.

Gordon

submitted her first application in approximately October of 2014, RA 344, which request was
evaluated and subsequently denied by SPS on May 7, 2015, RA 242. Gordon appealed, and in
July 2015 SPS upheld its decision. RA 240. Respondents did not initiate foreclosure proceedings
during this period of time, nor did they seek a foreclosure judgment or order of sale or conduct a
foreclosure sale. Having complied with the requirements of§ 1024.41 for Gordon's complete loss
mitigation application, and Gordon at all times having continued to be in default under the Deed
of Trust and the Note, Respondents were thus relieved from complying with the requirements of
§ 1024.41 for future loss mitigation applications submitted by Gordon. See 12 C.F .R. § 1024.41 (i).
Nonetheless, SPS considered a second loss mitigation application submitted by Gordon, which it
denied in September 2015. RA 52-56. Gordon initiated a third application on or around February
18, 2016, but never submitted the required documents to SPS within the timeframe specified.
RA34.
Accordingly, Respondents complied at all times with the requirements of 12 C.F.R.
§ 1024.41. Respondents evaluated Gordon's loss mitigation application. See id. at §1024.4l(c).
After denying Gordon's application, Respondents provided Gordon with an opportunity to appeal.

See id. at 1024.41 (h). After receiving a complete loss mitigation application from Gordon, and
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during the time such application and the related appeal were under review, Respondents did not
initiate foreclosure proceedings, seek a foreclosure judgment or order of sale, or conduct a
foreclosure sale. 10 See id at 1024.41 (f), (g).

B.

Respondents evaluated Gordon's loss mitigation applications in good faith.

The implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing requires parties to a contract "to
perform, in good faith, the obligations required by their agreement, and a violation of the covenant
occurs when either party violates, nullifies or significantly impairs any benefit of the contract."

Fox v. Mountain W. Elec., Inc., 137 Idaho 703, 710-11, 52 P.3d 848, 855-56 (2002). "No covenant
will be implied which is contrary to the terms of the contract negotiated and executed by the
parties." Idaho Power Co., 134 Idaho at 750, 9 P.3d at 1216. Indeed, a party does not breach the
covenant of good faith and fair dealing "by merely exercising its express rights" under the contract
in question. First Sec. Bank of Idaho, NA. v. Gaige, 115 Idaho 172, 176, 765 P.2d 683, 687
(1988); see also Clement v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 115 Idaho 298, 300, 766 P.2d 768, 770 (1988)
( finding that an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing cannot override an express
provision in a contract).
Here, Gordon's obligations to make monthly payments on the Note was secured by the
Deed of Trust, which explicitly granted the trustee with the right to foreclose and sell the Property
if Gordon defaulted on her obligations. RA 57-70. As the district court recognized, "because
[Respondents are] following terms of [the Note and Deed of Trust], [they] cannot violate the
covenant of good faith and fair dealing." RA 425.

10

Respondents initiated foreclosure proceedings on August 31, 2016 by recording a Notice of Default against Gordon
in Blaine County. RA 192-93. The foreclosure sale did not occur until April 24, 2017. Both events occurred well
after SPS had rejected Gordon's initial application (May 7, 2015) and subsequent appeal (July 2015). Further, both
events occurred well after SPS rejected Gordon's second application (September 2015). Gordon never submitted the
third completed loss mitigation application.
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Furthermore and more generally, the terms of the Note could not be reasonably be
modified. Under the terms of the Note, Gordon was obligated to make monthly payments in the
amount of $7,050.00 until March 1, 2036. RA 212-23. In her second loss mitigation application,
Gordon submitted documentation to SPS showing $9,681.75 in monthly income, with
approximately $8,000 of that income coming from a trust that was neither a borrower nor guarantor
under the Note. RA 55. As of March 2017, as a result of Gordon's failure to make any payments
since approximately June of 2012, the amounts owed on the Note consisted of $1,431,508.57 in
unpaid principal, $200,925.19 in accrued and unpaid interest, $50,792.26 in advances for unpaid
taxes and insurance payments, and $13,599.20 in other fees advanced by the lender. RA 137.
Gordon has made no showing as to how the terms of the Note and these amounts owed could be
fairly modified.

Indeed, she suggests that the Note should be modified to require monthly

payments of only $3000-$3500 with interest of 2% for an unspecified duration. See RA 38, 391.
Such a modification would also necessarily involve writing off substantial amounts owed in
principal, accrued and unpaid interest, and fees advanced by lender. Surely Gordon's proposed
modification is not required by the Note or Deed of Trust, applicable federal or state regulations,
or the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The district court was correct in concluding that
based on the evidence submitted, it was clear "that a loan modification can never work here." RA
425.

III.

THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ERR IN ALLOWING RESPONDENTS'
MOTION TO DISMISS TO PROCEED TO A HEARING.

Gordon appears to argue that the district court abused its discretion by hearing
Respondents' motion to dismiss, when the motion and related affidavits and materials were
allegedly not timely filed. See Opening Brief at 25. Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 7(b)(3) outlines
the time limitations on serving motions. Notably Rule 7(b)(3)(H) permits the district court to grant
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scheduled a hearing for April 4, 2017-two days prior to the then scheduled foreclosure sa le-to
hear Gordon ' s Motion for Temporary Restraining Order. Both parties subsequently filed various
motions, and both parties separately moved the district court to shorten the time so that all pending
motio ns cou ld be heard at the Apri l 4 111 hearing. See RA 303 (Respondents motion to shorten
time); RA 264 (Gordon's motion to shorten tim e). The district court, having found good cause,
granted both motio ns to sho1ten time. RA 307-3 10. Such a decision is explicitly authorized by
Rule 7(b)(3)(H).

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Respondents respectfully request that the Court affirm the
district court' s order granting summary judgment and denying Go rdon's motion for a Temporary
Restraining O rder and award attorneys' fees and costs in defend ing this appeal.
DATED thi s 29 1h day of March, 20 18.
PA RSONS BEHLE & LATIMER

Joa : -

By:

Attorneys for Respondents
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned certi fies under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State ofldaho that,
on the date given below, (he/she) caused to be served a copy of Respondents Brief upon the
fo llowi ng person(s) via F irst Class U.S. mail, postage prepaid:
(Ellen) G ittel Gordon
300 W. Main Street, Suite 153
Boise, ID 83 702
ggordonlaw@ aol .com

DATED this 29 1h day of March, 20 18.

-
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